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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3598 
___________ 
 
LINDSWORTH BROWN-SESSAY, 
Petitioner 
 
VS. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A076-576-183) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo A. Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 27, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Lindsworth Brown-Sessay (“Sessay”),1 a native and citizen of Jamaica who is 
proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”) 
final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition in part 
and deny it in part. 
I. 
  Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case 
only briefly.  Sessay entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor in 1994, and 
adjusted status to lawful permanent resident four years later.  In 2001, he pleaded guilty 
in federal court to armed bank robbery and related offenses.  In 2011, the Department of 
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, charging him with being 
removable for, inter alia, having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Sessay, through counsel, conceded the charges of removability and 
ultimately applied for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  His CAT 
claim centered around “his assertion that in 1999 he was involved in a drug trafficking 
scheme involving a high-ranking Jamaican police official who threatened him when the 
scheme went wrong and $200,000 worth of drugs went missing.”  (A.R. at 4.) 
 After holding a merits hearing over the course of two days, the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) denied CAT relief and ordered Sessay‟s removal to Jamaica.  In doing so, the IJ 
concluded that Sessay “has not offered believable, consistent testimony,” and that, “even 
were the Court to find him credible, [he] has failed to meet his high burden of proving 
                                              
1
 Brown-Sessay‟s filings refer to himself as “Sessay,” and we will do the same here. 
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that it is more likely than not he will be tortured upon return to Jamaica by or with the 
acquiesce[nce] of the Jamaican officials.”  (Id. at 96.)  On appeal, the BIA upheld the IJ‟s 
denial of CAT relief, concluding that, even if Sessay were deemed credible, his CAT 
claim failed because he had not met his burden of proof. 
 Thereafter, Sessay filed the instant petition and moved to stay his removal pending 
our resolution of the petition.  We denied that stay motion, and later denied his related 
motion for reconsideration.  His petition is now before us for disposition.  The 
Government argues that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.     
II. 
 Although “we generally do not have jurisdiction to review an aggravated felon‟s 
removal order,” Brandao v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)), we nonetheless retain jurisdiction to review 
“constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.”  8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  “Our jurisdiction in that respect is narrowly circumscribed in that it is 
limited to colorable claims or questions of law.”  Pareja v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 615 
F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  A constitutional claim or question of law is not colorable if “„it is immaterial 
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and 
frivolous.‟”  Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)). 
 Here, Sessay‟s brief presents a host of arguments that can be construed as 
asserting a legal or constitutional challenge to the agency‟s decision.  We agree with the 
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Government that a subset of those arguments fails to present a colorable claim.  
Accordingly, we must dismiss that portion of Sessay‟s petition for lack of jurisdiction.  
 Although Sessay‟s remaining arguments do present colorable claims, we conclude, 
after careful consideration, that none of those claims entitles him to relief.  Contrary to 
his assertion, the BIA‟s analysis of his CAT claim applied the appropriate standard of 
review and followed the framework set forth in Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United 
States, 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  Additionally, we are not persuaded by his 
claim that the agency failed to consider all of his evidence.  Nor are we persuaded by his 
suggestion that the IJ should have further developed the record by questioning him about 
certain facts undergirding his CAT claim.  Although an IJ is certainly permitted to 
question the alien during a merits hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), it was Sessay‟s 
counsel, not the IJ, who bore the responsibility of developing Sessay‟s CAT claim.2  See 
Abulashvili v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that an IJ 
“has a responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter and must refrain from 
taking on the role of advocate for either party”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 In light of the above, we will dismiss Sessay‟s petition in part and deny it in part.  
To the extent Sessay reiterates his request for a stay of removal, that request is denied as 
moot.  To the extent he seeks oral argument, that request is denied as well.  As for his 
request that he be released from immigration custody on bond, that request is not 
                                              
2
 Sessay does not claim that his counsel was ineffective. 
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properly raised here.  If he wishes to challenge the legality of that custody, he may file a 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the appropriate federal district court.  See 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005).  Finally, to the extent he 
wishes to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), he may move 
the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings on that basis.  We express no opinion on his 
likelihood of obtaining habeas relief or succeeding on a motion to reopen.  
